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THE PEOPLE, Rapondent, v. DONALD EDGAR KOENIG 
et at, Defendant; WILLIAM RIOHTER, Appellant. 
[On hearing after decision by the District Court of Appeal, 
Second Appellate District, Division Three, Crim. No. 3870 (72 
A.C.A.602 [164 P.2d 923], reversing judgment of the superior eourt. 
Judgment aftlrmed.] 
[1] Oriminal Law-Bvidenc:e-OonfeB8ioDL-A oonfeasion is an 
admission of guilt, and under Code Civ. Proe., § 1832, deftning 
indirect evidence, the testimony of a witness that defendant 
admitted guilt would seem to be direct -evidence that an admis-
sion or confeSBion was made by defendant, but circumstantial 
evidence of the truth of what was admitted. 
[2] Id.-Evidence-OircumstantiaJ Bvidence.-Circumstantial evi-
dence is as adequat<' to convict as direct evidence. 
[3] IeL-Instructions-Oircumstantial Bvidence.-Where circum-
stantial evidence is relied on by the prosecution, it is error to 
refuse a requested instruction or to fail to include in the in-
struction given a proper statement of the principle that, to 
justify a conviction, the facts or circumstances must not only 
be consistent with the theory of guilt but must he inconsistent 
with any other rational hypothesi!'. 
[4] Id.-Appeal-Harmleas and Reversible Error-Instructiona-
Oircumstantial Bvidence.-ln a prosecution for robbery, the 
erroneous failure ot give an instruction that, to convict de-
fendant on circumstantial evidence. the circumstances must be 
inconsistent with any reasonable theory of innocence, did Dot 
constitute ground for reversal where such error was not preju. 
dicial and did not result in 8 misearri~ of ;justice. 
[6] Witnesses-Determination of Oredibflity-&ight to DiBrelard 
'l'eatimon,..-In a prosecution for robbery, it wu DO ground to 
disregard the testimony of policE' oftiCE'rs. wit'h 1'eIIpeCt to eer-
[1] Confession as circumstantial evidence, note. 40 A..L.ll 4'Tl. 
See, also, 8 Oa1.Jur. 106: 20 Am.Jur. 416. 
[3] Instruction on circumstantial evidence in criminal case, note, 
89 A.L.tt. 1379. See. also, 8 Oal.Jur. 371: 53 Am.Jur. 574. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 458; [2] Criminal 
Law, § 585; [3] Criminal Law, § 894; [4] Criminal Law, § 1432; 
[5J Witnesses, § 292; [6] Criminal Law, 1691; (1] 0rimiDa1 lAw, 
14M. 
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tam cODversationa, that ODe or the other may have incorrectly 
recalled the time when the allp,a-ed statements by defendant 
were madt'o 
[6] Criminal Law-IDstructioM-CautioDa17-AdmissioDS.-In a 
prosecution for robbery, where the prosecution relied on evi-
dence of defendant's ora) admiasion of guilt, an instruction to 
view such evidence with caution should have been given in view 
of Code Civ. Proe .• ~ 2061, suM. 4, but the failure to give the 
instruction was not ground for reversal where it was improb-
able that, bad such instruction been given, the jury would 
have discounted the testimony to such an extent that it would 
have returued a different \'erdiet. 
[7] Id.-Evidene&-DeclaratioDi 01 One of Several Defendants.-
In a prosecution for robbery, where the trial court admonished 
the jury, at the time a poliee officer was testifying with regard 
to a conversation with a codefendant, that it could consider this 
conversation only u affecting laid codefendant, no substantial 
error resulted from the court'. failure to admonish the jury 
again at the time said etat.em.lt was read to the jury. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County and from an order denying a new 
trial. Arthur Crum, Judge. A!lrmed. 
Prosecution for robbery. Judgment of conviction affirmed. 
Leola Buck Kellogg and Monttomery G. Rice for Appellant. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, and Frank Rich-
ards, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J .-Defendants William Richter, Donald Koe-
nig and Ralph Hagenios were jointly charged with two counts 
of robbery while armed with a ,-nolver. Defendant Hagenios 
pleaded guilty. Appellant Riehter and defendant Koenig were 
tried by a jury and convicted They appealed from the judg-
ment and from orders denying their motions for a new trial. 
Koenig failed to perfect his appeal, and it was dismissed. 
Shortly after midnight of May 21, 1944, defendant Hagenios, 
armed with a .38-ealiber revoh,ft, entered a cafe in West 
Los Angeles and robbed the proprietor and a customer who 
was cashing a pay check. According to the testimony of a 
witness. HageniOl'l escaped from tbe scene in a green eon-
[6] See 8 OalJur. 305; 63 ADJw. 48L 
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vertible car, which W8.b immediately driven away as he 
stepped into it from the right side. This witness was unable 
to see the drivel' of the car. There was no eyewitness testi-
mony at the trial linking appellant Richter with the robbery. 
Richter and Bagenios were employed by the Veterans 
Administration in W 8frt Los Angeles, Riehtel' was ehief 
cook, and Hagenios worked under his supervision. The pro-
pl'ietor of the restaurant had been cashing pay ehecb for 
10 years and kept money on hand for this purpose. Two 
years before the robbery appellant had lived next door to 
this restaurant for six months. 
On May 22, 1944. defendant Richter and Hageni08 were 
arre.<rt.ed in a hotel room in Ocean Park, California, where 
they were registered under fictitious nameR after their re-
turn from San Francisco together on May 19th. It was not 
established whether appellant knew that they were 80 regis-
tered. At thill time appellant had a home in Los Angeles 
with his wife, who was out of town at the time of the robbery. 
At the time of the arrest, the police found in the hotel room, 
forty-nine .38-caliber cartridge.~ and a cartridge box that had 
contained fifty cartridges. At the time of the robbery, Rage.. 
nios fired one shot that lodgEd in the wall of the cafe. 
The victim of the robbery testified that HageniOA took 
$1,915, including the amount of the customer's pay check. 
When Hagenios and Richter were arrested they had $232 
and $278. respectively. on their persons. 
Police Officer Suber!l testified that he was one of the arrest-
ing officerI' and that when the cartridges were found in the 
hotel room. Hagenios told him that they were his, and that 
appellant at that time denied any knowledge of the robbery 
and stated that the $278 in his possession was derived from a 
sale of his automobile and a loan of $100, both negotiated 
before his trip to San Francisco, and $90 he won there on the 
races. Subel'!l also testified that appel1ant and Bagenios were 
lodged in the West LOA AngeleR jail, where on the night of 
!\fay 23d he had a convel'!!ation with the two prisoners and that 
during this conversation Police Officer Ward was present 
and that during the last part of the conversation Poliee 
Officer King was present. 
Subers testified that in the course of this conversation he 
advised the defendants that he had a good case against them 
and asked if they would plead guilty. He also requested their 
.. ; 
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cooperation in recovering the rest of the money. At this point, 
aecording to the witness, Hagenios denied getting more than 
$780, which included the money in appellant's and Ha-
genios' possession, $220 that had been given to Koenig, 
and money that had been spent. Appellant stated that 
"That was all they had gotten." The witness testified that 
Richter also said that he had given "Koenig $120 as his 
share of the job" and that "they [Hagenios and Richter] had 
picked" up the car used in the robbery "at a drive-in place 
at Wilshire and Santa Monica Boulevard"; that appellant 
said that he drove the car and abandoned it after the rob-
bery one block east of St. John's Hospital in Santa Monica. 
Police Officer Subers also testified to a later conversation 
at which Richter, Hagenios, Koenig, Officer King, and he 
were present. He asked defendant Koenig if he was sure 
that the $220 received from the other defendants was just 
a loan and appellant "spoke up and said, 'I gave you .120.00 
and it wasn't a loan.'" 
Police Officer King testified that he did not reeall the first 
conversation to which Subera had testi1ied, but that he was 
present at the second conversation after Koenig was brought 
in. He stated that he asked Koenig and Hagenios to "tell us 
about the robbery and Hagenios spoke up and said that all 
three were involved in the robbery, and that Richter had 
driven the car . < • "; that Richter at 1irst denied this "and 
then Hagenios said, 'You are into this as well as we are, and 
we are not going to take the rap for this alone; ... t.. At 
this point, according to the witness, appellant admitted that 
he drove the car. The rem of Officer King's testimony so far 
as it related to Richter, concerned the latter's description of 
the car as a green convertible and his admissions that he 
knowingly participated in the robbery, which the three of 
them had planned. The admissions as to the acquisition and 
disposition of the car were substantially the same as those 
Subers testified were made at the 1irst conversation. 
Police Officer Ward was not called to testify. Police Officer 
Burham testified that he received instructions on the night 
of May 23d to look for an automobile one block east of 
St. John's Hospital, and that he and his partner went 
to that location and found a· 1937 La Salle green con-
vertible that was on their list of stolen cars. 
Appellant testified that the money in his possession at the 
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trip of the money received from the sale of his ear, a $100 
loan, and $70 that he won in San Francisco on the races. He 
denied admitting guilt or making the statements attributed to 
him by Officers King and Subers and stated that he heard of 
the robbery for the first time when he was arrested. 
[1] Appellant contends that all the evidence against him 
was circumstantial and that the trial court failed properly to 
instruct the jury with regard to circumstantial evidence. 
Whether all t.he evidence was circumstantial depends OIl 
whether the testimony as to appellant's admissions was direct 
or circumstantial evidence. In other jurisdictions evidence of 
oral confessions is direct and not circumstantial evidence. 
(See 40 A.L.R. 571; note L.R.A. 1917D 595 and 73 U.Pa.L. 
Rev. 317; Underhill Criminal Evidence (4th ed., 1935) § 4.) 
Research has failed to reveal any ease holding otherwise, except 
Damas v. People, 62 Colo. 418 [163 P. 289, L.R.A. 1917D 591]. 
which was expressly overruled in Mitchell v. People, 76 Colo. 
346 [232 P. 685. 40 A.L.R. 566]. Section 1832 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, however, defines indirect evidence as 
". . . that which tends to establish the fact in dispute by 
proving another, and which, though true. does not of itself 
conclusively establish that fact. but which affords an inference 
or presumption of its existence. For example: a witness proves 
an admission of the party to the fact in dispute. This prove.c; 
a fact, from which the fact in dispute is inferred. ,. A confes-
sion is an admission of guilt (People v. Connelly, 195 Cal. 
584 [234 P. 374]), a fact in dispute. Under the statute, the 
testimony of a witness that the defendant admitted guilt would 
seem to be direct evidence that an admission or confession 
was made by defendant but circumstantial evidence of the 
truth of what was admitted. [2] Whether or not all evi-
dence of oral confessions or admissions must be considered 
as circmnstantial evidence under section 1832, we will as-
sume, for the purpose of this ease, that all of the evidence 
against appellant was circumstantial. That assumption does 
not lessen the weight of the evidence, for circumstantial evi-
dence is as adequate to convict as direct evidence. (People v. 
Latona, 2 Cal.2d 714 [43 P.2d 260]; 1 Jones, Commentaries 
on Evidence, 16-25; 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, § 926.) 
The trial court instructed the jury that "There are two 
classes of evidence recognized and admitted in courts of jus-
tice, upon either of which juries may lawfully find an accused 
guilty of crime. One is direct evidence, which is the direct 
) 
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testimony of any eyewitness. Such evidence may consist of 
any act, declarations or circumstances admitted in evidence 
tending to prove the crime charged or tending to connect 
the defendant with the commission of the crime. 
"If upon consideration of the whole case you are satisfied 
to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
guilt of a defendant, you should so find. irrespective of whether 
such certainty has been produced by direct evidence or by 
circumstantial evidence. The law makes no distinction between 
circumstantial evidence and direct evidence in the degree of 
proof required for conviction but only requires that the jury 
shall be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence of 
either the one character or the other, or both." 
The judge also instructed the jury that, "If the evidence in 
this case M to any particular count, is susceptible of two con-
structions or interpretations, each of which appears to you to 
be reasonable, and one of which points to the guilt of a de-
fendant, and the other to his innocence, it is your duty, under 
the law, to adopt that interpretation which will admit of such 
defendant's innocence, and reject that which points to his 
guilt." Appellant makes no objection to the general instruc-
tion but contends that the special instruction on evidence 
susceptible of two interpretations was not complete and that 
the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction of-
fered by appellant. [3] The requested instruction read, 
"In order that a jury may be warranted in finding a defend-
ant guilty on circumstantial evidence, all the facts and cir-
cumstances necessary to establish the conclusion of guilt must 
be proved beyond all reasonable doubt, all such facts and 
circumstances must be consistent with each other and with 
the conclusion sought to be established, which is that the 
person on trial committed the crime as (".barged. All such 
facts and circumstances, must be inconsistent with any rea-
sonable theory of the innocence of the defendant, William 
Richter, and such facts and eireumstances, taken all together, 
must be of such conclusive and satisfactory nature as to pro-
duce in the minds of the jurors a reasonable and moral cer-
tainty that the person on trial, William Richter, and not 
some other person, committed the offense charged." 
The requested instruction was improperly refused. In 
People v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 164 [163 P.2d 8], the defendant 
was convicted on circumstantial evidence alone under an in-
Itruction substantially identical with the one given in the 
.. 
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present case. It was held (27 Cal.2d 175} to be the duty 
of the trial judge, on his own motion, to include in the in-
struction a statement that ". . • to justify a conviction, the 
facts or circumstances must not only be entirely conllistent 
with the theory of guilt but must be inconsistent with any 
other rational conclusion." Such an instruction is required by 
the weight of authority if all the evidence is circumstantial. 
(See 89 A.L.R. 1378.) Although the requested inmruction 
deals with other matters, it properly stateR the principle of 
the interpretation of circumstantial evidence. The statement 
that the jury must find that "William Richter, and not some 
other person, committed the offense eharged"might have 
been left out. There were adequate instructions on the na-
ture of the offense, however, and the jury could not have 
been confused by this statement. 
The failure either to give the requested instruction or to 
include in the instruction given a proper statement of the 
principle that the evidence must be inconsistent with any other 
rational hypothesis was error. ['1 It does not follow, how-
ever, that error in this regard necessarily requires reversal 
of the trial court. In the Bender case, it was held that the 
failure to give a complete instruction was not prejudicial 
under the facts in that ease. Similarly in the present case such 
failure was not prejudicial. It is true that in People v. &If/ol, 
65 Cal.App.2d 462 [150 P.2d 812], the court held that the 
failure to give the complete instruction was prejudicial, but a 
conviction in that case involved the state's proving that the 
defendant knew that she had participated in an act of sodomy 
although she was under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
at the time, and the evidence was confined almost entirely to 
her participation. The jury could reasonably have concluded 
that defendant was not a knowing participant in the act. In 
People v. Hatchett, 63 Ca1.App.2d 144 [146 P.2d 469], the 
court also held that the failure to give the complete instruction 
was error, but it did not reverse on this error alone but on 
this error and several other errors that were substantial. 
[5] Appellant contends that the testimony of the two p0-
lice officers WaR so contradictory as to be unreliable, and that 
the other evidence, under the circumstances, was insufficient to 
RUstain the conviction. It is true that there were certain in-
consistencieR between the testimony of the two officers in re-
gard to who was present at the two conversations and as to 
whether certain statements were made by appellant at one 
94 PEoPLE tI. KOENIG {290.2<1 
time or another but these discrepancies were not substantial. 
As to the admissions that they testified were made by appel-
lant, the two witnesses were in accord. Certainly it is no 
ground to disregard such testimony that one or the other 
may have incorrectly recalled the time when the alleged 
statements were made. 
[6] Section 2061 of the Code of Civil Procedure, subsec-
tion 4, provides that on all proper occasions the jury is to be 
in. .. tructed "That the testimony of an accomplice ought to be 
vieweil with distrust, and the evidence of the oral admissions 
of a party with caution." No such cautionary instruction was 
given by the trial judge nor was one requested. It was formerly 
the rule that even the refusal to give such an instruction was 
not error on the ground that the instruction amounted to a 
mere commonplace statement of what every jury was believed 
to know. (People v. Raber, 168 Cal. 316 f143 P. 317].) Later 
the code section was held unconstitutional as authorizing com-
ment on the evidence. (Hirshfeld v. Dana, 193 Cal. 142 [223 
P. 451].) In People v. Vail, 22 Ca1.2d 642 [140 P.2d 828], 
the Hirshfeld case was overruled, and it was held that the 
section was never unconstitutional. In the DaB case an in-
struction was given directly contrary to the section with 
respect to the testimony of accomplices. No admissions were 
involved. In Conger v. White, 69 Cal.App.2d 28 [158 P.2d 
415], such an instruction with respect to admissions was re-
quested and refused. The court held this refusal to be preju-
dicial error in view of the equivocal nature of the admissions 
relied upon. The admissions in the instant case, if true, were 
far from equivocal. In view of the code section, however, 
such a cautionary instruction should have been given. In 
view of the record in this case, however, it is improbable 
that had this instruction been given, the jury would have 
discounted this testimony to such an extent that it would 
have returned a different verdict. 
[7] Appellant contend~ that a written statement signed 
by codefendant Koenig containing matters that tended to 
implicate appellant was received in evidence without the trial 
court's properly limiting its application solely to Koenig. The 
record shows, however, that when Police Officer Subers was 
testifying with regard to a conversation with Koenig, the court, 
at the suggestion of appellant's counsel, admonished the jury 
that it could consider this conversation only as affecting 
Koenig. Later this statement was read to the jury without 
Oct. 1946] WOODBINE tI. V AN HORN 
(2' C.2d '5; 173 P.2d 17) 
95 
further admonition, and none was requested. At the close of 
the People's case, the statement was offered in evidence as an 
exhibit solely against Koenig. The trial court instructed the 
jury that "Any statement you may find to have been made by 
any defendant after the commission of a crime, if you find a 
crime to have been committed, may be considered by you 8.<; 
evidence affecting, if it does affect, only the defendant who 
may have made such statement and not as ati'ecting any other 
defendant." Under these circumstances no substantial error 
resulted from the failure to admonish the jury again at the 
time of the reading of the statement. 
The jury was fulJy instructed as to reasonable doubt and 
in regard to the credibility of witnesses in general and was .\ 
told, in effect, that it must bring in a verdict of not guilty if 
there was any reasonable interpretation of the evidence that 
pointed to innocence. After careful examination of the record, 
we must conclude that the errors either alone or in combina-
tion, did not interfere with the substantial rights of the 
appellant or result in a miscarriage of justice. 
The judgment Ann order Are afflrm<,d. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter. J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
/ 
